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Abstract
In this paper we study the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria in load balancing
games introduced by Asadpour and Saberi [3]. We prove tighter lower and upper
bounds of 7/6 and 4/3, respectively. This improves over the best known bounds
in problem (19/18 and 3/2, respectively). Equivalently, the results apply to the
question of how well the optimum for the L2-norm can approximate the L∞-norm
(makespan) in identical machines scheduling.
1 Introduction
Load balancing problems are actively studied in the context of games. Transition from a
centralized optimization problem to a decentralized environment is immediate, by assum-
ing that the jobs are owned by selfish but rational players. These games are prototypical
of resource allocation problems in which users (players) do not act altruistically, therefore
leading the system to suboptimal configurations. Naturally, one can consider the social
optimum as the allocation minimizing the makespan, that is, the maximum load over all
machines (a classical measure of efficiency). In contrast, in the game-theoretic setting,
the players will optimize for their own job only, typically reaching what is called a Nash
equilibrium, that is, an allocation such that no player has an interest in moving to another
machine.1 The study of how inefficient these Nash equilibria can be is a central problem
in algorithmic game theory, as it measures how much selfishness can impede optimization.
Asadpour and Saberi [3] introduced and studied the inefficiency ratio of stable equi-
libria (IRSE) in several games, including load balancing ones (see Section 2 for formal
definitions). This notion quantifies the efficiency loss in games when players play certain
noisy best-response dynamics (see Section 1.1 for a detailed discussion). For load balanc-
ing games, the IRSE has another very simple and natural interpretation (which is also of
independent interest and studied earlier):
1In this work we consider pure Nash equilibria, that is, configurations in which each player chooses
one strategy and unilateral deviations are not beneficial. In general, games may also posses mixed Nash
equilibria in which players choose strategies according to a probability distribution.
1
Are the allocations minimizing the L2-norm (sum of the squares of the ma-
chine loads) also sufficiently good for minimizing the L
∞
-norm (makespan)?
Intuitively, the IRSE on load balancing games is equal to some value c if every allocation
minimizing the L2-norm is automatically a c-approximation for the L∞-norm (i.e., the
makespan of this allocation is at most c-times the optimal makespan). An exact bound
on the IRSE is not known (as opposed to othe measures related to the inefficiency of
equilibria – see next section). Asadpour and Saberi [3] proved an upper bound of 3
2
on
IRSE and observed that an example in [1] implies a lower bound on IRSE of 19
18
. In this
work we improve both bounds: In Section 3 we show an improved lower bound of 7/6,
while the upper bound of 4/3 is proved in Section 4.
1.1 Significance of the results and related work
The inefficiency of Nash equilibria is often measured through two classical notions: The
pice of anarchy (PoA) introduced in Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [8] for load balancing
games on related machines, and the price of stability (PoS) introduced in Anshelevich
et al. [2], which compare respectively the worst and the best Nash equilibrium to the
social optimum. In some cases, these notions can be considered too extreme as they may
include ”unrealistic” equilibria.
The IRSE [3] studies the quality of equilibria selected by certain noisy best-response
dynamics [4]. Intuitively, these dynamics will most likely rest on pure Nash equilibria
minimizing the potential of the game, and the IRSE can be seen as the price of anarchy
restricted to these selected equilibria (in fact, IRSE is also known in the literature under
the name of potential optimal PoA by Kawase and Makino [7], who also considered the
analogous potential optimal PoS ). In load balancing games (and several others) we have
PoS < IRSE < PoA, which in a sense tells that the PoA and the PoS are either too
pessimistic or too optimistic. Specifically, onm machines PoA =
(
2− 1
m+1
)
[5, 9], PoS =
1 [9], while IRSE is between 19/18 and 3/2 [3]. The latter bounds are strengthened in
the present paper to 7/6 ≤ IRSE ≤ 4/3. This means that players can easily compute
a 4/3 approximation of the optimum via these simple dynamics, but also that optimal
(exact) solutions are unlikely to be chosen either, in some instances.
The upper bound 4/3 also suggests and intriguing comparison with the study of
sequential PoA by Hassin and Yovel [6] for these games: There players are far from
myopic and the equilibrium is meant on an extensive form games in which players are
able to reason about future moves of following players. Our upper bound says that myopic
best-response are not worse than in their dynamics where players are capable of more
sophisticated reasoning.
2 Preliminaries
In load balancing we have n jobs of weight w1, . . . , wn that we want to put on m identical
machines (each job is allocated to one machine). The job allocation determines the load lj
of each machine j, that is the sum of the jobs weights that are allocated to this machine.
The goal is to find an allocation that has the lowest possible makespan, that is, the
maximum load over all machines.
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Figure 1: When a swap of bundles of jobs reduces the potential.
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Figure 2: Lower bound 7/6 on IRSE.
In load balancing games each job is a player who can choose any of the m possible
machines. The cost for player i is simply the load of the machine chosen by this player,
and naturally each player aims at minimizing her own cost. The strategies of all players
specify a job allocation (in the game theoretic terminology this is the strategy profile).
An allocation minimizing the makespan is called a social optimum, and its makespan
is called a social optimum makespan. The potential associated to an allocation is the sum
of the squares of the corresponding machine loads, l1
2 + · · ·+ lm
2 where lj is the load of
machine j at this allocation. An allocation minimizing the potential function is called a
potential optimum.
It is well known that load balancing games are weighted potential games with the
above potential function. This means that all pure Nash equilibria, allocations where no
player can unilaterally improve moving to another machine, are actually ‘local optimal’
for the potential (a single job move cannot reduce the potential). Asadpour and Saberi
[3] introduced and studied the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria (IRSE), which is the
ratio between the worst makespan of a potential optimal allocation divided by the social
optimum makespan.
Potential optimum allocations satisfy the following condition (see Figure 1). Split the
total load of each machine into two bundles of jobs, that is, lj = xj + yj where xj is the
sum of the weights of a (possibly empty) subset of jobs allocated to j. If two machines
i and j satisfy xi < xj , then yi > yj for otherwise swapping xi with xj reduces the
potential. Pure Nash equilibria satisfy the weaker condition that a single job in machine
i does not improve if moving to another machine j, that is, li − wi ≤ lj .
3 Improved lower bound
In this section we strengthen the 19/18 lower bound on IRSE in [3, 1].
Theorem 3.1. IRSE in load balancing games is at least 7/6.
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Figure 3: Proof of upper bound – Lemma 4.2.
Proof. Consider the instance in Figure 2 where m = k + 1 ≥ 3, n = 2k + 2 and the
weights of jobs are k, k, k, k + 1, k + 1, . . . , 2k − 1, 2k − 1, (5k − 1)/2. We prove that the
left allocation of jobs on the figure minimizes the potential function, while the one on the
right has optimal makespan, thus implying
IRSE ≥
(7k − 1)/2
3k
=
7m− 8
6m− 6
which tends to 7/6 as m goes to infinity. First note that the potential in both allocations
are equal. Consider any job allocation and without loss of generality assume that the
job with the largest weight is on machine 1. If we fix a load on machine 1, then any job
allocation which balances the load on the other machines minimizes the potential (among
all allocations with this fixed load on machine 1). Therefore, if the largest job is alone on
machine 1 then the potential is minimized in the social optimum case, while if it is located
on machine one together with job of smallest weight then the potential is optimized when
the job allocation is like on the left side of Figure 2. If the load on machine 1 is strictly
larger than 5(k − 1)/2 + k then the potential is not a potential optimal allocation. We
conclude that both allocations are potential optimal, in particular the one on the left
which gives the lower bound on IRSE.
4 Improved upper bound
Without loss of generality assume that a makespan in social optimum is equal to 1 and
loads of machines in the potential optimizer job allocation are sorted in a non-increasing
order l1 ≥ l2 ≥ · · · ≥ lm.
Theorem 4.1. IRSE in load balancing games is at most 4/3.
Proof. We have to prove that l1 ≤ 4/3. Assume that it does not hold, that is l1 =
1 + α > 4/3 implying α > 1/3. Machine 1 contains at least two jobs, otherwise the
optimum makespan would not be 1. The smallest job on machine 1, which we call s, is
strictly larger than α, otherwise since lm < 1 we can decrease the potential by moving
s to the last machine. Assume that the weight of s is α + β where β > 0 and since
α + β ≤ l1 − α − β = 1 − β it implies β < α. The proof of the theorem is based on the
following property of potential optimal allocations (whose proof is postponed).
Lemma 4.2. For any α > 1/3, in a potential optimal allocation, every machine must
have one job of weight at least 1− β or two jobs of weight strictly bigger than α.
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Figure 4: The two cases to prove Lemma 4.2.
Note that for α > 1/3 this contradicts the fact that the optimum makespan is equal
1 since any job from machine 1 has weight larger than α and together with these jobs
cannot be allocated on m−1 machines without exceeding 1 (clearly the jobs in machine 1
cannot be together in the optimum makespan, no three jobs of weight α can fit together,
nor a job of 1− β with a job of α).
4.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
We next prove Lemma 4.2. First observe that li ≥ 1 − β for otherwise we can move job
s from machine 1 to machine i and decrease the potential. Sort the jobs on machine i in
increasing weight, and consider a bundle of small jobs such that the load is still above or
equal to 1 − β after removing them from the machine (this bundle can be empty). Let
x be the overall weight of this bundle, and y be the size of the next job whose removal
reduces the load below 1− β. That is
li − x ≥1− β and li − x− y <1− β. (1)
Also note that
x+ y ≥ α + β (2)
otherwise we can exchange job s on machine 1 with job bundle of weight x + y on
machine i and strictly decrease the potential. If y was the only job after removing x,
then by definition y ≥ 1− β and the lemma holds. Otherwise, we show that y ≥ α. We
next distinguish two cases depending on the load li of machine i (see Figure 4):
(li < 1). From the first inequality in (1) we get x < β, and then by (2) y > α.
(li ≥ 1). If x < β then y > α > 1/3 using the same argument of the previous case.
Assume therefore x ≥ β and y ≤ 1/3 < α. Let z be the load of machine i after
removing the bundle of size x+ y, that is, li = x+ y + z. We rearrange the jobs in
the potential optimum and show that this will further reduce the potential, thus a
contradiction. The job rearrangement goes as follows:
1. Job s moves from machine 1 to machine i;
2. The smallest between x and y moves to machine m, while the biggest moves
to machine 1.
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Consider first the case x ≤ y. Then the difference between potential of the original
allocation and potential of the new one is
(1 + α)2 + (x+ y + z)2 + l2m − (1− β + y)
2
− (z + α + β)2 − (lm + x)
2 =
2
(
α + xy + yz + xz + β + βy − (β2 + y + αz + αβ + zβ + lmx)
)
>
2
(
α + xy + yz + xz + β + βy − (β2 + y + αz + αβ + zβ + x)
)
(3)
where the inequality is due to lm < 1. Next we prove that this quantity is positive
and obtain the desired contradiction. Note that y + z ≤ lm otherwise moving the
bundle of weight x to machine m reduces the potential. Therefore (3) is linear in x
with slope y + z − 1 ≤ 0 and since x ≤ y, we can bound it from below by
2
(
α + y2 + 2yz + β + βy − (β2 + y + αz + αβ + zβ + y)
)
≥
since this quantity is linear in z with slope 2y− (α+ β) ≥ x+ y− (α+ β) ≥ 0 and
z ≥ 1− β − x ≥ 1− β − α
2
(
α + 2y − βy − y2 + β − (β2 + y + α− αy + β − β2 − βy + y)
)
=
2
(
y − βy − y2 + β − (−αy + β − βy + y)
)
=
2
(
αy − y2
)
which is strictly positive since y < α.
The case y < x is similar to the previous one. Specifically, now the potential
difference is strictly bigger than (3) but with x and y exchanged,
2
(
α + xy + yz + xz + β + βx− (β2 + x+ αz + αβ + zβ + y)
)
(4)
and this quantity is linear in y with non-positive slope x+z−1 ≤ 0, since otherwise
moving bundle y to machine m would reduce the potential. For the case x < α
the rest of the proof is identical to the previous case with x and y exchanged. For
x ≥ α we use y < α and obtain a lower bound for (4) by replacing y with α, and
then z by 1− β − α:
2
(
α + αx+ xz + β + βx− (β2 + x+ αβ + zβ + α)
)
=
2
(
α + αx+ x− x(α + β) + β + βx− (β2 + x+ αβ + β − β(α+ β) + α)
)
= 0
where in the second step we use x ≥ β since β < α as observed before this lemma.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.2.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we improve lower and upper bounds on the inefficiency ratio of stable
equilibria in load balancing games, while still leaving a gap. We believe that our lower
bound example can not be improved. In order to prove this claim one has to consider
global properties of potential optimizer, while in our proof only local properties have been
used.
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